Perhaps if Bashar al-Assad could go back in time, he would not have chosen to end the "Damascus Spring," which was the main reason for the escalation of a national political crisis, ultimately setting the stage for the Syrian revolution that ended his rule forever.

The "Damascus Spring" emerged after Hafez al-Assad's death in mid-July 2000. From its beginning until February 2001, Syria witnessed relative changes, with a degree of freedom of expression and the establishment of unofficial political forums. These forums, or informal political salons, spread across the country, with intellectuals in almost every town calling for their creation. The number of such forums and salons reached approximately 170.

This atmosphere enabled the issuance of the "Statement of the 1000" in January 2001, in which the signatories called for pluralistic party-based democracy and the lifting of the state of emergency.

Additionally, a group of Syrian lawyers issued another statement calling for a comprehensive constitutional review, the abolition of exceptional laws and courts, and the release of public freedoms.

All this movement was steering Syria in the right direction! At that time, the authorities were somewhat receptive to this climate, leading to a series of reform measures in the early months of Bashar al-Assad’s rule. This was followed by several amnesty decrees and the release of hundreds of political prisoners after the closure of Mezze Prison in November 2001.

Intellectuals actively engaged in diagnosing the political situation and highlighting its flaws. However, Bashar al-Assad's greatest mistake was listening to what was said to be the "old guard." Shortly thereafter, all the forums were shut down, and 10 opposition figures were arrested. Among them were Riad Seif, Riad al-Turk, Mamoun al-Homsi, and Arif Dalila, who were charged with "attempting to change the constitution through illegal means." Assad also launched a widespread wave of arrests and increased security surveillance, bringing the "Damascus Spring" to an end within just seven months. As a result, Human Rights Watch described this period and what followed as "the lost decade."

Notably, in mid-April, the second document of the "Committees for the Revival of Civil Society" was issued under the title "General National Consensus." This was followed by a statement signed by 185 intellectuals in solidarity with statements issued inside Syria, calling for the release of public freedoms. In response, then-Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass remarked, "We are the rightful owners of power, and we will not allow anyone to take it from us. It comes from the barrel of a gun, and we are the ones who hold it. We have carried out multiple military coups and shed our blood for power!"

By the summer of 2002, Assad launched a reformist media campaign, accompanied by a continuous series of arrests, swiftly extinguishing the "Damascus Spring." Voices fell silent, and the "opposition movement" disintegrated.

The opposition returned with greater momentum on October 16, 2005, launching the "Damascus Declaration," a document signed by political forces and independent figures. The declaration called for an end to Assad’s rule, the establishment of a pluralistic democratic system, and the lifting of the state of emergency. It advocated for a "gradual and peaceful transition to democracy and equality among all citizens in a secular and sovereign Syria." This was the first direct statement against Assad’s rule, prompting his intelligence services to respond with brutal repression. Numerous activists were arrested, and various forms of suppression were exercised, including forced and arbitrary detentions, travel bans, and bans on peaceful protests.

This fueled a new crisis in early 2011, culminating in the Syrian Revolution of 2011—the most prominent consequence of the suppression of the "Damascus Spring." The regime’s repressive response ultimately led to Syria's destruction and the downfall of the Assad family's rule.

Building on this experience, it becomes clear why Damascus' leadership has allowed gatherings of suspicious groups and entities, many of which have questionable affiliations and alliances. On Saturday, March 22, 2025, various political currents, parties, and organizations announced the formation of a new entity in Damascus called the "Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance" (Tamasuk). Their founding statement called for a "decentralized" system in Syria and the convening of a national conference based on the "spirit of Resolution 2254." They affirmed their commitment to building a pluralistic, democratic, and civil state based on citizenship, justice, and dignity.

All of this was declared in a founding statement issued from the heart of Damascus.

The new political alliance included 35 secular parties, including Kurdish parties. However, the list of participating parties was not published—only leaked information was available. The brief launch statement and conference discussions did not outline their next steps, their operational mechanisms, or how they would engage with the public or the state. The alliance was presented under the name “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance – Tamasuk” and the slogan “Religion is for God, and the homeland is for all.”

Strangely, the parties forming the alliance refused to label themselves as either opposition or loyalists. Instead, they insisted that their role was to participate in building the "new Syria" according to their own frameworks. This contradiction led to a wave of withdrawals less than 24 hours after the founding statement was announced. The Communist Party withdrew in protest against Resolution 2254, calling it an "imperialist creation."

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party also withdrew due to clauses related to resolving the Kurdish issue.

Additionally, the Syrian Journalists Association clarified that it had not participated—only one individual had attended in a personal capacity, but the association’s name was added to the list. Meanwhile, the alliance itself did not issue any statement or comment on these withdrawals but simply edited its post to remove the names of those who had left.

It remains to be seen what will happen to the remaining members after this article is published!

Finally, we observe a positive stance from the nascent Syrian state in opening the door to freedoms to gauge the opinions of the Syrian public and examine the state of political parties, identifying their common grounds. However, instead of witnessing the revival of a "Damascus Spring 2," what we see is the political activity of suspicious entities, many of which were active during the former regime and have dubious affiliations. They seem to represent a singular ideological spectrum.

This does not mean an outright negative stance toward this gathering from the outset. On the contrary, it is a positive step for Syrians to move toward open political activity. However, this article aims to highlight that learning from the Damascus Spring experience does not necessarily mean witnessing another spring—it could very well be an autumn, where the leaves fall, exposing the trees beneath.

And here we find that clear institutional, legislative, and regulatory steps must indeed be taken by the new Syrian state, away from suspicious external influences or destructive internal tendencies. These steps can be summarized as follows:

A Fair and Open Legal and Legislative Framework:

Establishing a modern party law that ensures true pluralism and prevents external interventions, with a ban on suspicious foreign funding.
Activating the role of an independent judiciary to oversee the party landscape and prevent the infiltration of non-national forces.
Setting legal conditions and regulations to protect parties from interest-driven, sectarian, or separatist infiltrations.

Ensuring a Healthy and Competitive Political Environment:

Abolishing exclusionary practices and enabling parties to operate freely in accordance with the constitution and the law.
Encouraging national political movements to present clear programs for governance, economy, and development, away from extremist or divisive ideological rhetoric.
Strengthening parliamentary life and ensuring that parliamentary and local elections serve as a genuine gateway for evaluating parties based on their ability to achieve national interests.

Media Reform and Political Discourse:

Prohibiting inciting rhetoric and deliberate defamation of national parties in favor of suspicious agendas.
Supporting independent national media to serve as a true platform for dialogue between parties, free from blind polarization or official dominance.
Raising public awareness about the difference between parties with a national vision and entities linked to foreign forces seeking to control the country’s fate.

Transparency and Oversight of Political Funding:

Establishing an independent regulatory body to monitor party funding and prevent any suspicious external financial inflows.
Requiring parties to publish periodic reports on their funding sources and expenditures to ensure the integrity of political life.

Enhancing Public and Youth Participation:

Facilitating the involvement of youth and national talents in political work, rather than leaving it monopolized by old elites or influential forces.
Supporting parties based on realistic programs instead of personalism or empty slogans.
Launching national programs to promote political empowerment of national cadres across all provinces and regions, without discrimination or exclusion.

Rebuilding Trust in Political Institutions:

Purging institutions of corruption and security interference in party life to ensure a dynamic political scene.
Making the political process a genuine tool for change, rather than a mere formal facade as in the past.
Strengthening the oversight role of civil society in monitoring party performance to ensure their commitment to national interests.

With these measures and others, the new Syrian state can establish a clean political life based on genuine national competition, rather than a battleground for internal score-settling or the implementation of foreign agendas.

Political Office

Research Team

Research and Studies Department

Articles

Syrian Future Movement

The "Damascus Spring" experience and the autumn of "cohesion"