Uprising of the Arab tribes against SDF.. A victory or a defeat?

• Syrian Future Movement
  Political office
  Research and Studies Department
  Study No. (01-09-23)
  Issued on 09/11/2023 AD

Introduction:

On the 28th of August 2023, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrested Ahmed al-Khbeil “Abu Khawla”, who

is the leader of what’s called the “Military Council” in Deir ez-Zor province. Abu Khawla has a bad reputation in the area because of his corrupt actions. As a result, his arrest did not provoke any reaction from the tribes, especially the “Al-Akidat” tribe. However, the SDF’s subsequent raids on the headquarters and houses of the “Military Council” led to escalating tensions in northern Deir ez-Zor. The tribes attacked SDF positions, resulting in fierce clashes between the two sides. These events were exploited by the media in a systematic and planned manner. Nevertheless, this didn’t prevent reaching a fragile truce under the auspices of the US-led coalition, which tried to avoid clashing with any party. Despite this, the SDF, through their media, clarified that their actions against the corrupt were supported by the coalition leadership. In this study, we will examine the deep-rooted reasons for the tribes’ uprising, the motivations behind alignments, and the outcome of this uprising.

Deep-rooted reasons for the tribes’ uprising:

The apparent reasons for the tribes’ uprising trace back to the arrest of “Abu Khawla”, which could have been popularly employed in favor of the SDF due to his corruption and bad reputation. However, the SDF’s poor treatment on one hand, and the emergence of inciting calls and leaks against the Arabs on the other hand, had a profound and direct effect on the tribes’ mobilization and uprising. This is attributed to the following reasons:

First Reason: The SDF’s exploitation of the Arab element as a facade and a shield by:

1- Placing Arab mercenaries at the forefront of their ranks.

2- Not empowering Arabs to reach leadership positions.

3- Neutralizing the Arab element from administrative positions and decision-making, whether within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or the “MSD” (Syrian Democratic Assembly).

4- Mandatory conscription of Arab youth, and trying to persuade Arab women to join the Syrian Democratic Forces and protecting them.

Second Reason: Excluding the Arab element from influence circles by dismantling Arab sheikhs and bringing in Arab sheikhs with no influence in their tribes to lead them.

Third Reason: Feeling exploited and robbed of economic resources, especially oil.

Fourth Reason: A sense that the SDF leadership is heavily influenced by Kurdish Qandil factions.

Tribal Issue:

Hayyan Dukhan studies in his book on “The State and Tribes in Syria: Alliances and Conflicts”, the structure of the Syrian tribal society and the authorities’ dealings with it since the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate until the Syrian Revolution in 2011. However, the fragmentation the Syrian people experienced due to the war, and the displacement of many Syrians both internally and abroad, has disrupted the cohesive tribal fabric. This was evident in the recent conflict between them and the “SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces)”. Some tribes opposed the SDF, while others supported it. Some also sided with Iran and the Syrian regime. This indicates a structural disruption in the tribal core, making the tribes more like entities gravitating towards various political strategies, hence transitioning from a unified structural entity to one resembling bickering primitive parties, moving based on narrow interests rather than the collective’s benefit.

Strategic View:

The United States is bringing a vast amount of equipment to the region in an attempt to trim Iran’s influence and seeks through the international coalition to block the Iranian route between Iraq and Syria. Yet, the SDF declined to participate in any military operation against Iran and rejected the American proposal to link Tanf with the eastern and northern regions, fearing future connection with the northwestern region, which would imply a stable relationship with Turkey. This is something the Qandil current within the SDF refuses! Thus, the US looks for an alternative to the SDF on the ground, representing a force from the local population, specifically the Sunni Arab tribes of Syria and Iraq. Here, the interests of the SDF intersect with Iranian interests, aiming to deter this scenario since it would cost Iran its strategic depth with its arms in Syria or Lebanon. The SDF would also lose its current stature and gains from its relationship with the international coalition and its fight against ISIS. Thus, through the arrest of “Abu Khawla”, the SDF provoked the tribal sentiment, dragging it to a delicate juncture weakening and fragmenting it. The tribes’ loyalties are divided between the “Assad regime”, the “SDF”, and “Turkey”. Hence, under the pretext of fighting the Syrian regime and the tense situation with Turkey, the SDF’s grip on the region will tighten with long-term support from the coalition after ensuring the weakness and failure of the Arab tribal component as a whole.

Outcomes:

“QSD” (Syrian Democratic Forces) may have temporarily succeeded in disintegrating the Arab component, weakening it, and presenting it as incapable of discipline. However, at the same time, it has ignited an unrest that will not end here but will have an escalating echo through the following:

1- Hostile cells against “QSD” exploiting the situation to carry out individual retaliation operations, “lone wolves”, making “QSD” appear vulnerable.

2- Gaining a new, undisciplined enemy in the thousands on the Syrian front.

3- The deteriorating presence of “ISIS” makes it expand among the tribes that will not accept humiliation, exploiting the feeling of revenge to act against “QSD”.

4- “QSD” drawing the coalition’s attention to how it jeopardized its project by connecting Al-Tanf to the north, giving the coalition a reason to reshuffle alliances, especially as the relationship between the USA and Turkey (as two states) is ongoing and pivotal. This may pave the way for a covert US-Turkish security cooperation not in QSD’s interest, where the USA doesn’t appear at the forefront.

5- Addressing human rights violations committed by “QSD” in its latest attack, actions punishable under international law, which will have dire consequences for them.

6- Losing the Sunni Arab street in Syria, leading to their isolation.

Conclusion:

Regardless of the above analyses, we in the Syrian Future Movement believe that the relationship between the Arab tribes or some of them and QSD needs a review and reform through certain determinants before the situation gets more complicated, which won’t serve the stability of the region. We summarize these determinants as follows:

1- Achieving some demographic balance, making the Arab component feel its presence and importance side by side with their Kurdish counterparts, and ensuring its participation in the actual leadership system of the region.

2- Finding alternatives to violence in relations between the components.

3- Holding a meeting between QSD leaders and Arab tribes as they are the sons of this land for thousands of years, capable of coexisting within a harmonious framework that organizes the scene in the region.

4- Abolishing mandatory conscription.

5- Placing all economic resources, primarily oil, under the supervision of a body consisting of all parties, emanating from free and fair elections, benefiting the region’s people.

6- Allowing Syrians to return to their areas and abolishing the sponsorship law.

Finally, in the Syrian Future Movement, through our comprehensive national vision, we see the need to seek coalition consensus solutions based on a healthy social contract among all Syrian components, pushing forward towards implementing United Nations Resolution 2254.

• Political Bureau Study
  Researcher in the Department of
  Research and Studies
  Syrian Future Movement
  Jomaa Mohammad Laheep