The Future of Humanitarian Aid in Northern Syria”
The Syrian people were not accustomed to receiving foreign aid, and the concept of a food basket was not something that came to mind… All international and Arab aid used to exclusively go to the Assad regime, as a price for performing functional roles demanded of it…
The Assad regime was accustomed to playing the role of a bully in the region. It was tasked with dirty roles, or it would create crises, dangers, and threats, and then present itself as capable of resolving or controlling them…
Among its dirty functional roles was its involvement over thirty years in the Lebanese Civil War, its war against Palestinian resistance organizations, and much more. Its creation of dangers goes back to its involvement in drug trafficking, facilitating its transit, supporting terrorist movements worldwide, and providing a safe haven for them in Syria….
Due to the policy of Assad’s regime, which was fundamentally based on impoverishing the people to subdue them, stealing their resources, and spreading financial and administrative corruption… the majority of Syrians needed support for some basic goods through the regime’s government, as well as the free services in important sectors like education and health. The regime also fought against any Syrian civil gathering aimed at helping Syrians through contributions from those inside the country, prosperous expatriates, or Arab and international organizations interested in this field…
Syria, ruled by the Assad family, who considered it their own farm, suffered from severe economic problems even before the Syrian revolution. This was exacerbated by poor management of economic and social files and the erratic policies of Assad the son, forming a parasitic, monopolistic capitalist class composed of an alliance between the security and military authorities and merchants, exploiting the country and turning its economy into a means for rapid and illegitimate enrichment by refraining from building a modern productive economy that would undoubtedly require infrastructure as its basis… Of course, this never happened, and it was limited to building some bridges, malls, and commercial agencies for importing goods… Due to the poor economic condition (and some weather conditions like the drought in the Al-Jazira region in 2007—2008), there was intense migration from rural to urban areas in search of a monthly salary from the government or any job to make ends meet, forming belts of misery around major cities. The regime’s government gave no attention to addressing this catastrophic situation… Undoubtedly, the poor economic and social conditions played an important role in the revolution against the regime and its rapid spread like wildfire through the belts of poverty and misery in the cities and most Syrian rural areas, while the solid trade circles in the major cities remained loyal to the regime due to their intertwined interests with it.
The Assad regime faced the masses who rose against it with excessive brutality. Its primary goal was to destroy the popular support base of the revolution and its civilian aspect, by demolishing the reasons for its resilience and attachment to their land. This was achieved by destroying all service and productive infrastructures, driving masses of citizens to migrate abroad or to seek refuge in areas under its control, thereby depriving the revolution of its audience.
In the early stages, Syrians helped each other to provide sustenance for those who were displaced from their lands and left their jobs. Arab countries, through organizations, contributed to this relief and humanitarian support, and international aid also flowed to Syrian areas outside the regime’s control. Mostly, this aid was defined by the UN as emergency response and life-saving, including shelter in hastily established camps, health care, food baskets, clean drinking water, and some other basic services. This began in the second half of 2011. Of course, these aids did not match the other form recognized by the UN, known as early recovery or early rehabilitation, which primarily requires freezing the conflict, not resolving it. This has not yet happened in Syria, where no roadmap for a political solution has been set. The lines of battle are not governed by official truces but by temporary, interest-based, and often unwritten understandings among the main regional and international players. These lines are prone to shift, and war can reignite at any moment when the balance of power on the ground, which created these temporary borders, changes. These are real fronts that heat up and cool down, sending messages between all parties.
The twelve years of war have created multiple de facto regions, but what interests me here is the discussion about the northwest region of Syria, which is the true cradle and main stronghold of the Syrian revolution, and the only hope for its future victory. It is a miniature Syria, inhabited by everyone who rose against Assad and refused to submit to him in what was later known as ‘reconciliations’, including those who were forcibly displaced (by the ‘green buses’). The northwest region of Syria extends over an area of 20,000 square kilometers (twice the size of Lebanon) and is inhabited by more than 5 million people, more than half of whom are displaced from other areas. According to Turkish statements and declared plans, it is expected that a million Syrian refugees from Turkey will return to this area.
In this region, there are no significant natural resources; it is poor in water and lacks fertile, expansive agricultural land. Job opportunities are virtually non-existent due to the absence of real economic projects, and the infrastructure is minimal. Local councils, with support from the Turkish government and some Arab and international donors, manage to pave some roads and provide very limited governance, amidst an unstable security situation.
Generally, 90% of the inhabitants still live below the poverty line and require emergency طhumanitarian aid to survive in extremely harsh conditions. Due to the prolonged Syrian crisis, which will enter its thirteenth year next spring — one of the longest periods of humanitarian suffering this century — there is no sign of an imminent end or transition to an early recovery phase. This leads to a phenomenon known as ‘donor fatigue’ or ‘donor exhaustion’ in the world of relief organizations and donor countries, where the enthusiasm for providing aid diminishes and a belief arises that enough has been done, and that other disaster-stricken areas need help too.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Syrians faced a reduction in both the quantity and quality of Western aid, as the same Western donors are now focused on supporting more than 7 million Ukrainian refugees and those remaining in Ukraine. Ukraine represents the first line of defense for Western countries, hence their focus on supporting the displaced Ukrainians and those remaining in the country to strengthen their resolve.
As the West is one of the parties in the ongoing conflict, such as the war on Gaza, the truth and the people are the first victims of wars. The extent of the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip has come to light. The Western countries, prioritizing the inhabitants of the occupying state, face economic damages caused by the war, and more than 70,000 people displaced from settlements near the Lebanese border, require Western assistance. Western donors are also expected to support civilians remaining in the devastated Gaza Strip or those who might be displaced to Sinai or elsewhere.
All these burdens fall on the Western donor, who will inevitably find themselves compelled to significantly reduce the allocations previously made to Syrians. These allocations were already insufficient and plagued by local administrative corruption. Syrians should expect a sharp decline in the quantity and quality of these aids.
The political role governing the flow of these aids cannot be overlooked. The UN aid file for Syria, regulated by Security Council Resolutions 2585 and 2672, began in 2014. Syrians anxiously await the expiration of these resolutions and the ensuing negotiation marathon for their extension and modification, primarily involving the United States and Russia. These are often passed after Russia gains benefits in Syria or other unresolved issues, to avoid a Russian veto. In the summer of 2021, the extension of the UN resolution required a summit between Presidents Biden and Putin in Geneva.
With the Russian-American rupture after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the absence of understanding between them, the resolution began to breathe its last until the Russian veto put an end to it last summer. Despite this, Western donors have continued to challenge the Russians and keep sending aid under various pretexts.
It must be taken into account that these aids will gradually decrease, and it’s essential to start an early Syrian recovery without waiting for the donors. This is manifested in supporting Syrian civil society organizations operating in the region and funding them through donations from Syrian businessmen. These organizations, or any other entity, should take charge of the early recovery phase, facilitated by local authorities and independent of them.
Rationalizing support for the population and ensuring it reaches the weakest segments should be the action plan for the next stage, to encourage productive work and gradually reduce dependence on support.
Individual initiatives, supported by local authorities, to encourage investment in the liberated north and create job opportunities in small, micro, and medium projects, and securing the physical, legal, and security infrastructure, are urgently needed and could be the motto for the next stage. Especially since the Euphrates Shield area is exempted from the American Caesar Act sanctions, creating an environment conducive to attracting local, Turkish, and Arab capital.
All these measures aim to improve the living conditions of the residents who bet on the revolution’s victory to build a new, free Syria, awaiting their great salvation and return to their homes from which they were forced to flee due to the regime’s violence. Those who wish to stay in the north can do so, as Syria belongs to everyone and the Syrian people are one.
Dr. Basel Ma’arawi
