Issued on December 12, 2023, was what is known as the “Social Contract for the Democratic Autonomous Administration of the Northern and Eastern Regions of Syria.” The first social contract dates back to the declaration of autonomous administrations in the regions of Al-Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin in 2014. It was later amended to become the charter for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria after its declaration in 2018. In July 2022, the committee for the re-drafting of the social contract for the Autonomous Administration, consisting of 158 members, held its first meeting in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, and ended with the formation of a 30-member subcommittee to finalize and adopt the amended charter.

The statement by the Syrian Islamic Council issued on December 19, 2023, a week after the announcement of the social contract, can be understood in the context of the intervention of the World Council of Churches and its sponsorship of what was then called “the Syrian Social Contract Paper.” The demands of Syrian figures to the World Council of Churches in the second half of 2012 led to the sponsorship of meetings that lasted from 2012 to 2015, resulting in the drafting of what was called a “shared narrative” titled “The Testament of Syrian Accord.” This was later developed into a principles paper titled “Determinants of the Syrian Social Contract” at the end of 2016, and these efforts continued until March 2019, culminating in a single 20-point paper titled “Towards the Foundations for Shared Living and Determinants for a Syrian Social Contract.”

Therefore, there has been no official position from the Syrian opposition regarding the social contract, except for some factions from the National Army, allowing room for discussion about the possibility of reaching a Syrian point of convergence through the idea of “West Germany” adopted by the Syrian Future Stream, where Germany was described as “Syria’s grandmother.”

From here, it’s possible to study the positives and negatives of this contract objectively and search for a meeting point we strive to reach.

First, Criticisms of the Social Contract:
Several major criticisms of the social contract include:

Accusations of the Autonomous Administration seeking a covert separation, due to its establishment of a social contract akin to a constitution and describing the seven cantons it organized under its administration as a “region.”
Rejection of the term “peoples” used in the social contract, on the grounds that this term is applied to peoples under multiple states, not human components under a single state like the Syrian people.
Imposing certain abstract political concepts like “democratic modernity,” which confronts and opposes “capitalist modernity,” thereby dragging the Syrian people into imaginary battles not recognized in international norms.
Neglecting to mention the protection of the Arab component, and only specifying the Kurdish and Syriac components.
Secondly:
A Positive Perspective:
Undoubtedly, Syria is currently divided into realistic zones of influence, even if not officially recognized. Therefore, any attempt to organize these areas towards a national Syrian vision is commendable. Organizing the zones of influence in northern and eastern Syria through laws referencing organizations subject to popular participation and recognized by an official judiciary will be preferable to the unregulated, militia-style rule.

Thirdly:
A Cautious Perspective:
The Autonomous Administration undoubtedly has the task of responding to all legitimate inquiries from Syrians about the social contract it launched. It must diligently work to dispel both separatist and non-separatist fears, whether due to this contract or other reasons. Conversely, the Syrian opposition must provide real, tangible answers to the justified fears of a possible separatist project in its areas under Turkish guardianship, where the Turkish flag is raised on most official and unofficial buildings in the northern areas controlled by the Syrian opposition.
On one hand, and on the other, we will try to look objectively (without bias) at the criticisms and the possibility of turning them into a gateway for Syrian discussion and dialogue to reach common ground.

Reading the 134 articles of the social contract, one can notice the popular participation in decision-making in the northeastern region, thus betting on the people themselves to resist any separatist project from within the region’s structure.
Article 5 states that “the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria is part of the Democratic Republic of Syria,” and Article 133 contains an important clause: “The contract is amendable in case of an agreement on a democratic constitution in Syria.” Therefore, the fear of separation becomes illusory, although it may be a considered concern due to Syria’s current state of war.
There is no political or legal problem in using the term “peoples” instead of “the people” within one state, as established in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, which states: “to promote stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” This is exemplified in the specific mention of the rights of “indigenous peoples” within a single country, as stated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007.
The Syrian people are rich in their internal and external political stances, so every party has the right to adopt the political ideas it sees fit, as long as the reference for this is the people through a democratic organizational structure.
Regarding the Arab component, three articles can answer the absence of its specific mention in the social contract:
Article 13: Decisions directly affecting the components are adopted based on the principle of consensus.

Article 15: Consolidating the values of shared living according to the principles of a democratic nation filled with the spirit of fraternity among all peoples and groups in North and East Syria, within a free and fair democratic societal system.

Fourthly:
Between the Social Contract and the Public Morality Law:
While we in the Syrian Future Movement were pioneers in supporting the activation of the “West Germany” project, considering it as Syria’s grandmother, and encouraging all parties to succeed in this project as an alternative to the Syrian regime. We continue this support, considering it a levy for clinging to the current situation until a political solution is reached or imposed. This solution would legitimize all the agreements through which the Syrian regime has sold the country’s plains, coasts, mountains, interiors, air, and land. This also applies to the Syrian opposition as part of what has been agreed upon, potentially leading to a more bleak and uncertain future for Syria, even after a political resolution with the Syrian regime.

In this general atmosphere, we are faced with the first event, the (social contract) established by the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria.
And the second event, the (Public Morality Law) adopted by the Salvation Government in northwestern Syria.
Through these, we aim to assess the real situation reached in the areas outside the regime’s control and the stark contrast between them. We strive to read reality with moderation and fairness, without being swayed by populism and wishful thinking.
Despite all the criticisms of the social contract of the Autonomous Administration, we notice the danger of this contrast in the way of thinking. While the northeastern regions seek a contractual formula among its peoples, the northwestern regions are sinking in factional disarray, increasing aversion among factions, and fragmentation within the same faction. This leads them to continuously escape from their troubled reality towards areas of opportunism, closing malls, and issuing laws concerned with music, hijab, and mixing of genders!!
What a contrast between an autonomous administration focused on its responsibility and organizing its ranks democratically, ((even if we disagree with it))!!, and the image on the other side with the Salvation Government, and then our official opposition and its politically delayed maturity.

There will always be those who focus on depth and essence, and those who drown in superficialities and appearances. This difference makes us say: Our collective concern should be creating a social contract that organizes all our future relationships with our new state that we aspire to and yearn for through the goals and principles of our Syrian revolution.

Conclusion and Recommendation:
There is undoubtedly increasing sensitivity among Syrians towards the Syrian opposition, the Autonomous Administration, Islamic groups and bodies, such that the Syrian reality pleases neither friend nor foe. Therefore, it is easy to remain in a stage of throwing accusations, exchanging betrayals, and competing for collaboration chairs. However, in the Syrian Future Movement, we try to work realistically through our national vision, seeking ways of national consensus, even if minimal.
Therefore, we recommend the following:

Support and endorse any democratic organizational work in Syria, build on it, consider its positive aspects and support them, and address contentious points to dismantle them.
Emphasize fighting separatist thought, considering different views on centralized, decentralized, confederal, and federal systems.
Foster a moderate Syrian movement that seeks possible meeting points between the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian opposition, a role we in the Syrian Future Movement strive to be a part of, aiming for the “West Germany” project to unify areas outside the Syrian regime’s control with support from the international coalition, and possibly Turkey.
Recognize political and ideological differences, and the Syrian people’s right to choose their international allies, thus attempting to reconcile viewpoints between the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian opposition, even minimally, and making this issue an important national task, despite its apparent difficulty.
Utilize the Syrian opposition’s international relations with Turkey and the SDF’s with the international coalition to mediate an end to hostilities between them, especially the hostility between Turkey and its war on the SDF, and to eliminate fears among all parties.
Leave social issues for the post-state-establishment phase, focusing on the idea of contracting as a legitimate right for Syrians under de facto authorities.

Jumaa Muhammad Laheeb
Director of Research and Studies Department at the Scientific Office of the Syrian Future Movement

Social Contract of the Autonomous Administration: A Moderate Perspective