Water in Syria has constituted a critical geopolitical and economic element. Its management has been tied to the policies of the Syrian regime since the 1970s, and the crisis has worsened with climate change and the recent war.
Syria is also considered one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to water crises, not only due to climate change but also because of its sensitive geopolitical location at the heart of the Middle East, where regional and international interests intersect with its limited water resources.
In this article, we explore the current water situation in modern history and how regional factors, from neighboring policies to cross-border conflicts, have shaped Syria’s water reality.
Water as a Tool for Political Control during the Assad Regime and the Revolution Period:
The policies of the defunct Syrian regime were characterized by managing water resources to reinforce political loyalties. Since the Ba’ath Party took power in 1970, the distribution of water resources was used as a means of buying loyalty, particularly in Sunni rural areas through the expansion of intensive irrigation projects.
By 2000, the agricultural sector consumed 90% of the country’s water resources, supported by government policies aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency. This led to the depletion of groundwater reserves and the deterioration of infrastructure.
The regime also granted drilling privileges for wells without licenses to families loyal to it, especially around Damascus, where unlicensed wells accounted for 87% compared to 38% outside the capital.
Drought intensified between 2006 and 2010, destroying 85% of livestock in eastern Syria and causing the collapse of agricultural production. This forced hundreds of thousands to migrate to cities and contributed to the outbreak of protests in 2011.
During the Syrian revolution (2011–2024), water became a weapon, and water resources turned into a battleground during the armed conflict through:
Post-Liberation Phase (2024): Reconstruction Challenges and External Interventions:
After the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024, complex challenges emerged, foremost among them the reconstruction of water infrastructure. Syria needs between $500 and $700 million to repair distribution networks, according to statements by the Syrian Minister of Water Resources.
In addition to the ongoing humanitarian crisis—for example, in al-Hasakah, 600,000 people have been suffering from water cuts since 2019 due to the shutdown of the Alouk station. Furthermore, there is Israeli intervention: Israel has seized strategic water resources in southern Syria, such as the dams on the Jordan River, threatening water security and deepening economic dependency. Finally, there is inherited corruption. The Syrian Minister of Economy has indicated that systematic corruption during Assad’s rule turned infrastructure into a “corrupt system,” hindering reforms.
The Regional Impact on Water in Syria: Interactions of Drought, Conflict, and External Interventions:
The Euphrates River, which originates in Turkey, is the main source of water in Syria, providing 90% of the country’s freshwater needs. However, Ankara has used this resource as a political pressure tool, particularly after constructing a series of massive dams such as Atatürk and Ilisu, which reduced the flow into Syria by 40% between 2019 and 2023.
This caused the water level of Lake Assad to drop by 6 meters, threatening the drinking water source for over 5 million people in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.
According to the 1987 agreement, Turkey committed to providing Syria with 500 cubic meters per second annually, but it reduced the amount to less than half during the recent drought waves, claiming “harsh climate conditions,” while reports suggest that water is being used as a bargaining chip in issues such as supporting its allies from the Syrian opposition against the Syrian Democratic Forces and the defunct regime.
In 2019, Turkish forces took control of the Alouk water station in al-Hasakah, depriving one million people of water repeatedly, and the station has been used as a tool to pressure the Kurdish self-administration.
Although Israel did not directly participate in the Syrian conflict, its water policy in the occupied Golan Heights affects Syria’s water security. Israel controls 30% of the Golan’s groundwater resources and exploits springs that once fed the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), reducing the flow of water to Syria and Jordan. A 2020 report by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies warned that climate change will increase the flow of “climate refugees” toward Israel’s borders, which may push Israel to tighten its control over water resources as a preemptive security measure.
Water scarcity in neighboring countries (such as Lebanon and Jordan) is also expected to exacerbate regional vulnerability, which in turn may reinforce Syria’s dependence on negotiating with Israel for water shares.
Climate Change and its Cross-Border Impact:
Syria shares climate challenges with neighboring countries, but its weak infrastructure makes it the most affected. Climate modeling by the RICCAR project predicts that temperatures in Syria may rise by 4°C by 2060, with rainfall decreasing by 25%, threatening to reduce the annual flow of the Euphrates River by 30%.
Additionally, the historic drought (2006–2010) devastated the livelihoods of 1.3 million Syrians and forced 800,000 to migrate to cities, which some analysts consider one of the triggers of the 2011 protests. Today, this scenario is repeating, with forecasts of an even more severe drought by 2030.
Limited Regional Efforts and Water Cooperation:
Despite the challenges, there are fragile regional initiatives to address the crisis, including:
Conclusion:
The water crisis in Syria remains a reflection of the intertwined regional and international factors, from Turkish dams to global warming.
While scientific projects like RICCAR provide tools to understand these challenges, practical solutions require re-engineering regional relationships and ensuring transboundary water resource management.
Without this, Syria will shift from being a battlefield to a hotspot for climate crises that threaten the stability of the entire Middle East.
Water in Syria has always been a double-edged sword: a tool for political control and a source of humanitarian crises. Despite the political changes after 2024, the legacy of the defunct regime and the international conflict mean that economic recovery is tied to reforming water management and regional cooperation.
Without this, Syria will remain trapped in a vicious cycle of scarcity and conflict.
Therefore, we in the Economic Office of the Syrian Future Movement recommend the following:
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