Qatar and Its Role in Syria: A Third Perspective

There are various interpretations of Qatar’s role in Syria, ranging from those who sanctify it to those who oppose it. Some Syrian opposition currents represent the former perspective, while the Syrian regime embodies the latter.

A third perspective is becoming increasingly necessary for us as Syrians, to prevent the truth from being lost between two contradictory sides. This study aims to provide that perspective.

Syrian-Qatari Relations:
Syrian-Qatari relations were continuously and increasingly developing on all fronts, particularly economically, before the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. The relations, which started before 2003, were governed by several agreements. A significant shift occurred following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Doha in 2003, resulting in over 13 agreements covering various activities in both countries. Notably, in 2007, the Islamic International Bank was established with a capital of 5 billion Syrian pounds, and the Qatar-Syria International Bank with a capital of 100 million dollars, along with other diverse projects like the Qatari Diar’s tourism project on the Syrian coast, exceeding 200 million dollars.
The Syrian-Qatari Holding Company and other agreements further strengthened the cooperation between the two nations.

Qatar supported Syria’s stance on the Lebanese resistance, and reciprocally, Syria supported Qatar in its disputes with the Bahraini Emirate before that. This strong relationship positioned Qatar as a mediator between the Arab League and the Syrian regime at the onset of the Syrian revolution, following the initial Arab initiative on August 28, 2011, which called for an immediate ceasefire, release of detainees, dialogue among all parties, and political reforms including constitutional amendments. Qatar, along with Saudi Arabia, played a pivotal role in this initiative after five ministerial meetings of the Arab League. Qatar then chaired the Arab ministerial committee on October 16, 2011, to seek a resolution through communication with the Syrian regime and opposition.

The Qatari role became evident in the efforts of then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim. Despite meetings with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, the Syrian regime’s obstinacy led to its suspension from the Arab League on November 12, 2011. The Syrian regime specifically targeted the Qatari and Saudi embassies in Damascus, marking a significant political escalation. Earlier, on March 30, 2011, the Emir of Qatar had phoned Bashar al-Assad, urging him to change his approach to the peaceful Syrian movement. This phase marked a significant shift in positions, as seen in the second Arab initiative launched by the Arab ministerial council on January 22, 2012, calling for Assad to delegate his powers to his deputy and prepare for a transitional phase and presidential and parliamentary elections.

As the Syrian situation evolved with the international intervention by sending Kofi Annan as a special envoy, Qatar hosted the fourth meeting of the Arab ministerial committee in Doha on April 17, 2012, attended by Annan to discuss the ceasefire outcomes. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim later emphasized the need for a time frame for Annan’s mission and urged the UN Security Council to adopt non-military measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited Syrian opposition figures, including Dr. Zaher Baadarani, President of the Syrian Future Movement (SFM), to Qatar to discuss various strategic issues and reach a shared vision.
Qatar reiterated its stance at the UN Human Rights Council on June 1, 2012, stating that killings and terror in Syria amounted to crimes against humanity.

Qatar’s role in Syria entered a new phase, supporting the Friends of Syria conference with the Gulf Cooperation Council, held on February 24, 2012. Qatar formally requested military assistance for the Syrian opposition. The Saudi Foreign Minister at the time, Saud Al Faisal, withdrew from the conference due to its limited scope to humanitarian aid. However, at the second Friends of Syria conference in Istanbul on March 1, 2012, Saudi Arabia, through Saud Al Faisal, supported Qatar’s stance on arming the Syrian opposition, considering it a duty.

During this period, Qatar emerged as the most significant supporter of the Syrian opposition, with a green light from the U.S.
The Financial Times reported in 2013 that Qatar spent about three billion dollars in two years to support the Syrian uprising, surpassing other governments’ contributions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Qatar was the largest arms supplier to Syria, funding over 70 air shipments to neighboring Turkey from April 2012 to March 2013.

Qatar also established training camps for Syrian opposition fighters on its territory in collaboration with the U.S. military, graduating over 1200 fighters annually.

Qatar played a significant role in supporting the MOC (Military Operations Center), an external military room led by the USA, France, Britain, Jordan, and some Gulf countries, including Qatar. It comprised several factions from the Free Syrian Army in Daraa, Quneitra, Rural Damascus, and Northern Aleppo, established in 2013, with an evolved role by 2014.

Qatar’s support for the Syrian opposition remained consistent, both in humanitarian aspects through aid and services, and politically by replacing the Syrian regime’s embassy with one for the Syrian opposition coalition. Militarily, Qatar’s firm stance against the return of the Syrian regime to the Arab League in May 2023 is notable.

However, Qatar’s role has been criticized for supporting extremist groups, like Jabhat al-Nusra (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham).
The Washington Post revealed a deal involving the release of Qataris detained in Iraq, the release of Iranian soldiers in Syria, and a demographic change operation in the towns of Kafriya, Al-Fu’ah, Madaya, and Zabadani, in cooperation with Hezbollah and Jabhat al-Nusra. This was later used against Qatar in Gulf disputes, accusing it of funding and supporting terrorism. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim described this as a shift in Arab policy towards “prey,” where Qatar played an Arab role in its capture.

Undoubtedly, the Syrian situation has become an international quagmire, not just a Syrian one. Support for Jabhat al-Nusra was initially part of a global backing for the Syrian opposition, which embraced the group at its inception.
This was represented by Moaz al-Khatib, president of the Syrian National Coalition, defending it in international forums, and Jabhat al-Nusra manipulating the MOC by introducing fictitious factions under its control (under the name of the Free Syrian Army) to receive arms.

Today, Syria stands at a historic crossroads with the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood, the Sweida movement, Jordan’s battle with Iran and the Syrian regime over Captagon, and the attempt by the SDF to impose its divisive vision through the recently launched social contract. This is especially during a clear weakening of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its internal divisions between Al-Jolani and the Eastern wing led by Abu Maria Al-Qahtani and Ahmad Zakour. In the humanitarian aspect, fears are growing over the cessation of international humanitarian aid for the new year. All this clearly shows the Syrian need for more Arab support, especially from Qatar, to prevent different countries in Syria from monopolizing the fate of the Syrian people.

Therefore, we recommend that the Syrian opposition give significant importance to Qatar’s role for several reasons:

1. Qatar’s consistent stance against the Syrian regime.
2. The presence of the sole official embassy of the Syrian opposition in Qatar.
3. Qatar’s good relations with various Syrian factions and groups, from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the National Army, and others.
4. Qatar’s good relations with both the USA and Turkey, which can benefit our proposal of the “West Germany model” applied in Syria outside the Syrian regime’s control areas.
   Qatar’s role can be effective in the Syrian scene, helping it emerge from the quagmire that threatens to engulf everyone. This can be achieved through two active axes:
5. Qatar’s adoption of the West Germany model.
6. Qatar taking over the humanitarian aid file in northern Syria.

References:

• Gulf States and the Syrian Crisis: Levels of Action and Summary of Positions | Al Jazeera Center for Studies (aljazeera.net)
• Argument between the Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Russia about Syria – DW – 2012/3/10
• http://www.arabic.euronews.com141/
• Towards a Realistic Assessment of the Gulf States’ Reception of Syrians | The Washington Institute
• Syrian Opposition Urges U.S. to Consider Designation of Jabhat al-Nusra | Reuters (reuters.com)
• Qatari Support for the Syrian Opposition Exceeds 3 Billion Dollars | Zamn Press | زمن برس
• Qatar’s Role in Fragmenting the Syrian Opposition (aawsat.com)
• Bashar al-Assad Summarizes Qatar’s Role and What Happened in Syria in 5 Years.. Asserts: The War Began 3 Decades Ago with the Emergence of Satellites – CNN Arabic
• Qatar’s Policy in the Syrian Revolution – MENA Research Center (mena-researchcenter.org)
• Internal Reasons for the Stumbling of the Arab Spring (mena-researchcenter.org)
• New Qatari Project for ‘Unifying’ the Syrian Opposition – Shaam Times News Agency (shaamtimes.com)
• Qatari Mediations: Goals, Objectives, and Costs – BBC News Arabic
• “Jabhat al-Nusra”: A Qatari Tool in Service of the Iranian Agenda in Syria | Sky News Arabia (skynewsarabia.com)
• Qatar Continues to Support Terrorist Groups Worldwide.. Western Reports: Doha Funds Armed Organizations with Money and Weapons like ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Muslim Brotherhood.. Human Rights Organizations: The Qatari Regime Persists in Human Rights Violations Without Accountability – Youm7 (youm7.com)
• After 12 Years.. Syria Regains Its Seat in the Arab League | Sky News Arabia (skynewsarabia.com)

Mustafa Al-Mohammed
Researcher in the Research and Studies Department
Syrian Future Movement