The Future of the Russian Occupation of Syria
During the annual press conference of the Russian President, which discussed the results of the year 2023, where he answered questions from journalists and Russian citizens about local and global situations, he stated, “Russia does not plan to withdraw its forces from Syria, indicating that Russian deployment sites in Syria are points, not bases…
He added, “The Russian military is present in Syria to ensure Russia’s interests in this region of the world, close to Russia,” confirming that “as long as the presence of those military units is beneficial to Moscow, they will remain there.”
The Russian President noted that his country “does not build long-term structures in Syria and can withdraw all its military personnel from Syria quickly and without any material losses if necessary.”
The Russian President did not reveal a secret…Certainly, the Russian intervention was to achieve vital interests and strategic goals for his country, and the way to do that was to protect the Assad regime from falling, which is the means to achieve the greater end… Putin considers the continued presence of the Assad regime, which is oppressive to the Syrians, as a Russian success story…and proof of Russia’s ability to play important roles in geographically distant surroundings….
In the absence of a strategic American vision that aspires to Putin’s ambition… The Russian army invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia from it.. In 2014, it annexed Crimea in the sight and hearing of the world and was only confronted with sanctions and condemnations that did not stop its rush to restore Russia’s role as a global pole…
Due to the complex Syrian scene and some fears of the Syrian revolution factions taking over Damascus and overthrowing the Assad regime after the failure of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard formations to maintain it…
Some saw that a Russian military intervention in Syria prevents it from falling completely under Iranian influence…
The Israeli occupation state saw that its experience with Assad the father and son was successful as they worked to protect its borders for more than four decades from any threat, regardless of its size or source, and it had no objection to the Russians protecting it because the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t…
Most likely, the Americans did not object to that intervention as long as the Israelis and Arabs were satisfied with it…and they found in it an entanglement for Moscow in a new Afghan quagmire that drains the excess Russian power and Putin’s recklessness, and fear of a Russian invasion of other parts of neighboring countries under pretexts that are not difficult to adopt as an excuse….
The Americans stipulated for giving the mandate to the Russians is to work on a Russian administration of the Syrian file and achieve a solution that ends the war in Syria and does not spread its sparks to the neighborhood, according to realistic formulas that stem from the reality of the ground for the implementation of international resolution 2254 so that Assad does not die and the opposition does not perish…
Putin benefited from his occupation of the decision of the Syrian regime and the establishment of multiple military bases, the most important of which are the Tartus naval base and Hmeimim airbase, which are located on the Syrian coast..and secure Russian influence in the rich Eastern Mediterranean basin, which surrounds the south of the European continent and threatens it…and we later discovered that all that Russian deployment outside its geographical area was necessary to implement what Putin plans for the invasion of Ukraine and threaten the European continent from the east and also threaten NATO….
Putin tried to renege on his understandings with the Americans and monopolize the entire Syrian cake alone and later expel the American influence….and after failing to fulfill his promises to achieve a solution sponsored internationally… but he negotiated to achieve a Russian solution through the Astana axis that overthrows everyone…
The Americans militarily positioned themselves in eastern Euphrates after defeating ISIS and did not withdraw from Syria and deprived the Assad regime of a third of Syria’s area, which also constitutes the economic lever for any Russian rehabilitation of the Assad regime…
The U.S. administration implemented the Caesar Act to prevent any economic recovery for the Assad regime.
The United States continued its policy of isolating Assad politically and diplomatically, refusing to reintegrate him into the international arena or treat him as a victor in the Syrian war. Meanwhile, the Turks were struggling (and sometimes cooperating) with both the Russians and Americans, trying to compensate for their delay in making bold strategic decisions in Syria.
The Syrian revolution was one of the biggest losers of the Russian military intervention, along with Turkey, which found itself facing the emergence of a Kurdish statelet on its southern border. After the major battles ended in 2020, the balance of power on the ground forced everyone to freeze the conflict and stabilize the front lines until variables changed that would allow the imposition of a solution agreed upon by the intervening powers on the Syrians or until the balance of power shifted, leading to a breakthrough that reflected the new power dynamics. This shift happened on February 24, 2022, when the Russian army invaded a neighboring country, shifting its focus and most of its efforts to the European front, where NATO awaited, draining the civil and military capacities of the Russian state.
The final and major break between Putin and the West, particularly the United States, occurred after Russia’s war on Ukraine. NATO mobilized politically and militarily against Russia, and a hot war unfolded in Ukraine, while the conflict encompassed all issues in all regions. It seemed to be a zero-sum struggle, necessitating a victor and a vanquished.
All communications between Moscow and Washington were cut off, especially regarding the Syrian issue, as evidenced by their failure to extend the U.N. Security Council resolution on the continued flow of humanitarian aid to Syria.
The Russian involvement in the Ukrainian war led to the erosion of Russia’s military and political power in Syria, evidenced by the withdrawal of elite military forces and equipment, including the Wagner Group. Politically, Russia’s influence could no longer impose any agenda or policy, as seen in the failed attempt to normalize relations between Turkey and the Assad regime, an initiative Moscow sponsored.
Some believe that one of Washington’s major strategies is to decisively defeat the Russian army in Ukraine and strip it of any material and moral strength that could delay its defeat.
This strategy includes imposing sanctions on Russian energy and about 7,000 sanctions on the Russian Federation, thereby eliminating Russian influence and interests around the world.
The presence of Russian military bases in Syria and political influence in the Middle East is something the U.S. aims to eliminate.
Initially, the U.S. strategy involved making the Russian military presence in Syria a burden to Moscow rather than a strategic advantage, without direct confrontation between the two countries’ forces. There have been provocations by Russian aviation and violations of understandings in Syria, which the U.S. forces contained without reopening any negotiation channels with Moscow or coordinating with Hmeimim.
Some believe that the U.S.’s new strategy in the region, accelerated by the war on Gaza, is to build a regional security system that includes countries in the region but excludes Iran. This involves clipping Iran’s wings by striking its nuclear facilities, especially after failing to reach an agreement with the Western group.
Moscow and Tehran might have tried to disrupt this course with the Al-Aqsa flood and by mixing up all the cards. This regional security system can only be achieved by removing Russian and Iranian influence from the Eastern Mediterranean to ensure safe energy supplies for Europe, which has permanently divorced Russian energy.
Some expected the U.S. to begin implementing its plans by closing the Syrian-Iraqi border, cutting off Iran’s regional axis geographically, weakening Assad in Damascus to force a political solution leading to his downfall, and forcing Hezbollah in Lebanon to abandon its arms and become a political party, in accordance with international resolutions 1701 and 1559.
It’s impossible to determine a timeline for these actions, as the other side understands the danger of the plan. After the surprise of the Al-Aqsa flood, escalation is underway in Bab-el-Mandeb and the Arabian Gulf waters, threatening international trade routes. The other side may have more surprises, as it possesses the capacity, tools, and interest for sabotage or disruption of U.S. efforts.
The latest statement by the Russian president reflects his concerns about the real goals of the U.S. military buildup in the region, particularly in the Mediterranean. He understands that he is the prime target, as the state of occupation does not need this force for its war on Gaza.
The Russian president is the primary target of the U.S.
The recent international changes are likely to benefit the Syrian revolution and the Syrian people in general. Moscow and Tehran, which support the tyranny in Syria, are the targeted and ultimate losers from the new regional situation.
By Dr. Basel Marawi
