Iran and the Option of “Easing Hostility” with the Syrian Opposition

Syrian Future Movement
Scientific Office
Department of Research and Studies
Research (م. ع01-12-23)

Introduction:

• The hostility between Iran and the Syrian opposition has reached a zero-sum state. Iran, which initially supported the Arab Spring movements, swiftly changed its stance when the Syrian regime was threatened, opposing and thwarting the revolution. This was done by exploiting the international community’s support for the Syrian revolution at the time, and its rejection of the Assad regime’s repressive and brutal response. Iran aimed to expand its influence and authority both in the government and across the geographical landscape of the nation.
• Therefore, it can be asserted that the hostility has become established, existing, and ongoing. From this, it becomes necessary to explore the notion of “easing the hostility,” rather than “friendship” or “reconciliation.”
• This research engages with reality to argue for the idea of “easing hostility” and presents an unprecedented, realistic plan and proposal.
• It’s crucial to distinguish between the public’s stance against any political force that uses religion and demographic change as its policy, and the political currents, parties, and groups that have temporarily assumed authority in the Syrian opposition. It’s important for populations to remain vigilant against fragmentation, but it’s equally essential for decision-makers to find realistic avenues to pursue benefits or avert harm, whether in the short, medium, or long term.

Perspective on the Relationship with Iran:
The approach to the relationship with Iran can be seen from two perspectives:

1. Public Perspective: This can be summarized as a “reaction” rather than an action itself. Iran has engaged in sectarian invasions under various political guises, including:

• Political Shi’ism, exploiting any method or behavior, considering Shi’ism as a sect organically linked to the concept of the Imamate and the Supreme Leader. The goal is to seek followers of a political authority, not a sect or religion.
• Recruiting and dominating young Syrians in their controlled areas through teaching Shi’ism, offering scholarships to various Iranian cities like Qom, Mashhad, Tabriz, Isfahan, Tehran, etc., in addition to establishing seminaries and Husayniyahs in Syria, and facilitating economic and security gains for others.
• Spreading Shiite shrines and treating them as centers of political influence, as part of an inherited Shiite policy.
• Supporting and encouraging militia activities, clearly seen in Iraq and Syria.

1. Political Perspective: This involves viewing Iran as part of the “axis of evil” as labeled by the West, and treating it as a hybrid state between old theocratic and modern national states. Iran is seen as a power that has established a far-reaching entity, centrally controlled through a religious dictatorship, exerting control through religious authority more than through contractual interest. Iran is thus treated as a rogue state, with its operatives avoided as much as possible, through international measures like the nuclear deal and regional arrangements like the Saudi-Iranian agreement in China and strategic relations with Turkey in the Islamic world.

The Option of “Easing Hostility”:
The Syrian opposition and Iran face two options. The first is the current state of zero-sum conflict, forcing the Syrian opposition to confront the Iranian project in Syria and the region. This requires the Syrians in the opposition to present themselves as a frontline Sunni defense against Iranian Shiite encroachment, rather than as revolutionary and opposition forces. The second option, deemed currently impossible, involves considering “easing hostility between the Syrian opposition and Iran.” The Scientific Office in the Department of Research and Studies of the Syrian Future Movement sees the need to explore this option now, considering its improbability as a reason to study its pros and cons and to expand the vision for stakeholders.

Study of the Option:
This option is addressed from four perspectives:

1. Challenges:

• From the Public Side: Resolving issues within the “absorption” culture includes:
  a. Ending Political Shi’ism through societal prohibition, spreading necessary religious awareness, and supporting Sunni religious institutions and centers. Shi’ism, like Sunnism or Christianity, can be either non-proselytizing or proselytizing. Islam, in its majority excluding esoteric sects, is a proselytizing religion.
  b. Strengthening the state to address the issue of militias operating at its expense. The solution lies in establishing the state first and then extending its authority, as the absence of a strong state leads to fertile grounds for militia activities.
  c. From the Political Side: Understanding the nature of Syrian politics is essential. The Syrian opposition and its support base lack a clear, defined discourse to frame its nature. The revolutionary national Syrian perspective can establish the following:
  * Avoiding dragging our people into a bloody conflict beyond their capacity.
  * Major countries involved in the conflict are earnestly trying to resolve their issues. The nuclear deal between the West, led by the USA, and Iran is progressing post-Trump’s withdrawal in July 2015, with certain wings of the Democratic Party in America supporting it. The Saudi-Iranian agreement in China, though negotiations may take a long time, does not harm Saudi interests in the short term. The strong relations between Turkey and Qatar with Iran pose a real question about why the Syrian opposition raises hostility towards Iran to the highest level!
• The existence of a reformist stream in Iran, strengthened by Iranian public demonstrations against the hardliners, could be an important gateway for communication and coordination with the Iranian side. The presence of an acceptable mediator, like Qatar and Turkey, is a key factor in resolving most political issues.

1. Obstacles: Several factors hinder the transition from a state of absolute hostility to one of reduced hostility:
   a. Current blood feuds and their connection to historical Sunni-Shiite vendettas.
   b. The ongoing humiliating occupation of Syria by Iran, even to the Syrian regime itself.
   c. The continuation of Iran’s narrative that labels the Syrian opposition as extremist Sunni terrorism.
2. Positives:

• Merely reducing conflict among the region’s peoples, and transitioning from a regressive military conflict to a civilized, rational disengagement, is a positive and noble goal. This is especially true for a nation whose book is the Quran and whose prophet is Muhammad. The most significant positives include:
  a. Reducing the pace of Sunni-Shiite hostility and decreasing extremism on both sides.
  b. The triumph of dialogue and strategic cooperation over endless cycles of revenge.

1. Negatives:
   a. Acknowledging Iran’s expansion and influence in the region.
   b. The weakness of Sunni regional powers in the face of Iran’s expansion into Sunni areas, forcing them to deal with Iranian influence as a fait accompli.
   c. The benefit to extremist religious factions in condemning those who advocate such an option.
   d. Potentially angering the West, which is hostile to Iran (if it exists at all).

Conclusion:

• The hostility continues, and its conditions and circumstances are expanding. Therefore, we acknowledge that discussing the easing of hostility might seem unrealistic. However, considering it by some wings of the Syrian opposition (at least) deserves our attention. This proposal aligns with the Arab, Islamic, and international inclination towards this strategic option.
• It is essential to consider the reasons behind the Iranian narrative that labels the Syrian opposition as terrorist. Perhaps breaking this narrative can be achieved through moderates on both sides, in addition to the role of a Sunni mediator like Qatar.
• Resisting the Iranian occupation is undoubtedly a patriotic act. What we have mentioned does not criticize this but directs it. Easing hostility does not mean the absence of hostility; it means transforming the enemy into an opponent, peer, or partner in certain issues, such as increasing moderates and reformists in Iran and Syria, and seeking Shiite religious figures who believe that Iran’s political actions will negatively reflect on Islam in general and on Shiites in particular.
• The Lebanese experience in the southern suburbs shows that betting on political Shi’ism and militia work is unproductive. Hezbollah, Amal Movement, and all Iran-aligned currents are merely one Lebanese party among others. Iran has contained them and then directed them. However, politically Shiite militias have no respect in their sectarian circles; they are militias that disintegrate at any military juncture, as seen in the recent Ain al-Rummaneh battle.

Through this narrative, the Research and Studies Department of the Scientific Office of the Syrian Future Movement recommends a practical, realistic action plan as follows:

1. The existence of intent and will on both the Iranian side and the Syrian opposition side, and the effort towards creating a new media discourse to activate this will, as a practical start for the option of “easing hostility,” which transforms enmity into rivalry, with the hope that the future will transition it towards a political gain.
2. Introducing an acceptable mediator for both parties, and we advise that the mediator be a state, to ensure the option and its outcomes.
3. Establishing a joint monitoring and auditing body between the Iranian side and the Syrian opposition to oversee the progress of the agreement and its continuity.
4. Informing regional and international allies about this plan and its strategic importance, dispelling legitimate concerns about this option, ensuring the legitimate political rights of the Syrian people, and guaranteeing the “easing of hostility” between Syrians and Iran.

• Following what has been stated, and according to the vision of the Syrian Future Movement, we recommend the necessity of contact and coordination between the Syrian opposition and the reformists in Iran, through an accepted mediator by both parties. This should involve declared and transparent steps for the general populace. The Syrian Future Movement, with its moderate positions and historical background, can contribute to establishing acceptable and solid rules towards this step, provided it has popular or Syrian elite support.

Syrian Future Movement
Scientific Office
Department of Research and Studies
Jumaa Mohammad Laheeb